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Abstract
We show that no finite protocol (even if unbounded) can guarantee an envy-free
division of a cake among three or more players, if each player is to receive a single
connected piece.
1 Cutting cakes
An early result for cake cutting [5] is that a cake can always be divided among n players,
using n− 1 cuts, in such a way that no player considers another piece to be more valuable
than its own. In this paper we show that no finite protocol can guarantee finding such a
division.
As usual we represent the cake as the unit interval [0, 1]. Possible cuts are points in the
interval and possible pieces are subintervals S = [x, y] ⊆ [0, 1]. The limitation to n− 1 cuts
means that each player’s piece consists of a single connected interval. Players’ preferences are
represented by nonatomic measures on [0, 1]. We write vi for the i-th player’s measure, and
either vi(S) or the shorthand vi(x, y) for the value to the i-th player of the piece S = [x, y].
The requirement that the measures be nonatomic means that vi(x, x) is always zero. (This
means that we can represent pieces as closed intervals without worrying about the values of
the endpoints.) Note that the measures are determined by the values of Fi(x) = vi(0, x) for
all i and x. We assume throughout that vi(0, 1) = 1, so that each vi is a probability measure
and each Fi is actually a (cumulative) distribution function. For the measures we consider
in this paper, Fi is also a bijection.
An allocation of pieces to players, piece Si to player i, is called envy free if vi(Si) ≥ vi(Sj)
for all i and j. The result mentioned above is that for any system of players’ measures, there
is an envy-free division in which each player receives a single interval. One proof of this
result is Su’s argument in [6], which works for all n. Su’s method is constructive in the sense
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that an explicit sequence of divisions is constructed, with the actual envy-free division as its
limit. Because it requires convergence, it isn’t a finite protocol.
Other non-finite procedures are available in the case of n = 3. A moving-knife algorithm
was given in [5], and a simpler moving knife algorithm in [1]. Both of these procedures involve
continuous operations. Since each of the procedures requires that players watch more than
one knife simultaneously, there is no obvious way of replacing the knives with a finite bidding
or trimming process. So these procedures can’t be called finite, either.
By contrast, there is a simple finite protocol for dividing a cake between two people—“I
cut, you choose”. There is also a finite protocol for envy-free division among three people,
if five cuts are allowed and each player receives two of the resulting six pieces (the Conway-
Guy-Selfridge procedure, [4]). One might ask—and Steven Brams did ask, at the Dagstuhl
Fair Division Seminar [2]—whether there is a finite protocol in the case of three players, two
cuts, or more generally n players, n − 1 cuts with n ≥ 3. The purpose of this paper is to
answer this question in the negative.
The first issue, of course, is what constitutes a finite protocol. We address this in Sec-
tion 2, following the paper by Woeginger and Sgall [7]. We do not require that the number
of steps be bounded in advance; as a consequence, the conclusion of this paper applies to
both bounded and unbounded protocols, as long as they are finite.
In Sections 3 and 4 we prove the main theorem for n = 3. In Section 3 we introduce
a special class of examples which we call “rigid measure systems.” A rigid measure system
consists of three measures vA, vB, vC with certain properties. (When n = 3 we index the
players by i = A,B,C .) A consequence of these properties is that there is a unique pair of
cuts that produces an envy-free division among players with these measures. In this sense,
the measures are rigid; but the class itself is sufficiently flexible that the location of the cuts
cannot be determined by examining a single measure, even knowing that it is part of a rigid
measure system. In Section 4 we combine these concepts to prove that there is no finite
protocol for the case of three players, two cuts, even if we assume that the players’ measures
form a rigid measure system. The case of n > 3 is addressed in Section 5.
2 What are finite protocols?
We recommend the paper of Woeginger and Sgall [7] for its discussion of finite protocols,
building on the framework of Robertson and Webb [3]. Like Robertson and Webb they are
concerned with counting steps in their protocols. In this paper we are only concerned with
whether the protocols are finite, which means that we can gloss over several issues that are
treated much more carefully by Woeginger and Sgall.
In this paper, a finite protocol is one in which only finitely many marks are made on the
cake. Formally, a mark is a real number x ∈ [0, 1]. Initially, marks are at 0 and 1 only. A
protocol proceeds in steps. In each step, the protocol selects a player i and a real number
α, and invites player i to make a mark at x such that vi(0, x) = α. (For the measures
we consider in this paper, the player’s choice of x is unique. Woeginger and Sgall call x
the player’s “α-point.” We assume that the players answer honestly.) After any step, the
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protocol may terminate by cutting the cake at n−1 of the existing marks and allocating the
pieces to the players.
We assume that whenever a mark is made at x, the players reveal the values of vj(0, x)
for all j. As a consequence, the values of vj(x, y), for all j and all existing marks x and y,
are common knowledge. Otherwise, the protocol operates without direct knowledge of the
player’s measures.
The choices of i and α at each step may be determined by the protocol in any manner,
provided that they are based only on the existing marks and the knowledge of the players’
measures so far revealed. Similarly, the choices of whether to terminate at any step, how to
cut the cake, and how to allocate the pieces may be determined in any manner based on the
same information.
A protocol is finite if it is guaranteed to terminate after finitely many steps, whatever
the players’ measures. It is bounded if, for some integer N , it is guaranteed to terminate
after at most N steps. Our theorem applies to finite protocols, whether bounded or not.
It is worth restating these notions in the framework of Woeginger and Sgall. They define
two types of queries:
• Marking query: The protocol selects a player i and a real number α; the player marks
the cake at the least x for which vi(0, x) = α.
• Value query: The protocol selects a player i and an existing mark x; the player provides
the value of vi(0, x).
(Woeginger and Sgall use the word “cuts” for what we call marks. We prefer to reserve “cut”
for a mark that actually becomes the endpoint of some player’s piece.)
The protocol is using the players as oracles. Player i can provide single evaluations of
Fi(x) (value queries) or F
−1
i (α) (marking queries). A finite algorithm is one that consults
oracles finitely often.
In this paper we are saying, in effect, that one marking query equals one step. Effectively
we are allowing all possible value queries to be made after each step. Since each new mark
enables only finitely many new value queries, this seems like a reasonable convention. (It is
also used by Robertson and Webb.)
It would not change our result if we were to allow steps in which the protocol calculates a
mark directly from the available information. Nor would it matter if we were to allow random
protocols—no random protocol can guarantee a result after finitely many steps unless every
realization of it, treated as a deterministic protocol, can make the same guarantee.
We give two examples of protocols, one that we accept as finite and one that we reject.
Example: A finite, unbounded protocol that doesn’t work. Consider this pro-
tocol: Enumerate the rational numbers, and for each rational number α, ask each player to
mark the cake at its α-point. Terminate whenever an envy-free division is possible using
existing marks. (Alternatively, we might just as well enumerate the algebraic numbers. We
could also allow the protocol to mark the cake directly at rational or algebraic points.)
A protocol of this type would be finite, and would always find an envy-free allocation, if
it were the case that for any set of measures there is an envy-free allocation with rational
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piece values (or algebraic values, or rational or algebraic piece widths). We will see in the
next section that there are systems of measures for which no such envy-free allocations exist.
Therefore protocols of this form cannot be guaranteed to terminate.
From here we could head into logical thickets. Given some notion of “constructible”
numbers, we could enumerate them and design a protocol as above. It would find any envy-
free solution in which the piece widths or piece values are all constructible. To draw the
conclusion we want, we must claim that there are measure systems for which no such envy-
free allocations exist. Looking ahead to the next section, we are claiming that there are
rigid measure systems whose parameters x, y, s, t are not constructible numbers. In effect,
the players are allowed to construct their preferences in ways in which the protocol is not
allowed to construct numbers. We will go no further in this direction.
Example: A “cheating” protocol. Consider this sequence of events (from Woeginger
and Sgall): The first query is addressed to player 1. The player ignores the content of the
query. Instead, the player codes its entire measure into a real number x, and marks the
cake at x. Each of players 2 through n − 1 then does the same thing. The next query is
addressed to player n, who observes the existing marks, infers the other players’ measures in
their entirety, and calculates an envy-free allocation off line, perhaps using Su’s algorithm.
Player n then marks the cake at the point where the first cut should be made. In response
to more queries, player n reveals the rest of the cuts, and then the algorithm terminates.
This is a finite algorithm that guarantees an envy-free allocation, but it is utterly foreign
to the spirit of cake cutting. We turn away from it in horror.
More practically, we exclude this protocol by requiring that the players answer honestly.
As a result, in a finite algorithm, each player is allowed to announce only finitely many of
its α-points. Woeginger and Sgall address this issue further. It is, finally, the only serious
limitation on the kinds of steps we can allow in a finite protocol.
3 Rigid Measure Systems
In this section we define rigid measure systems. Let x, y, s, and t satisfy 0 < x < y < 1,
0 < s < 1/3 < t < 1/2, and s+2t = 1. Then a rigid measure system (RMS) with parameters
x, y, s, t is a set of three measures {vi} for i = A,B,C with these two properties:
1. The density of each measure is always strictly between (
√
2/2) and
√
2. Equivalently:
If S is a piece of length `, then
(
√
2/2)` < vi(S) <
√
2`
for every i.
2. The player’s values for the pieces defined by x and y are given by the following table.
[0, x] [x, y] [y, 1]
vA t t s
vB s t t
vC t s t
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We need some lemmas about rigid measure systems. The first lemma says that players
in an RMS cannot differ too greatly in their comparisons of two pieces.
Lemma 1 Let i and j be two players with measures in a rigid measure system, and let S1
and S2 be any two pieces. If player i values S1 as at least twice the value of S2, then player
j does not value S2 as at least twice the value of S1. That is: If
vi(S1) ≥ 2vi(S2)
then
2vj(S1) > vj(S2).
Proof: This is a consequence of the bounds on the densities of the measures. Suppose
S1 and S2 have lengths `1 and `2 respectively, and vi(S1) ≥ 2vi(S2). Then
2vj(S1) > 2(
√
2/2)`1
=
√
2`1
> vi(S1)
≥ 2vi(S2)
> 2(
√
2/2)`2
=
√
2`2
> vj(S2).
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The next lemma is the reason for calling these systems “rigid.”
Lemma 2 If vA, vB, and vC form a rigid measure system with parameters x, y, s, t, then
every envy-free division of the cake among A, B, C has cuts at x and y.
Proof: First, cuts at x and y do give an envy-free division—in two different ways. The
pieces [0, x], [x, y], and [y, 1] can be given to players A, B, and C respectively; or, they can
be given to C , A, and B respectively. In each case, each player assigns value t to its own
piece and no more than t to any other player’s piece, so the division is envy free.
We will see that no other cuts can give an envy-free division. Suppose that instead of
making cuts at x and y, we make them at xˆ and yˆ.
If xˆ ≤ x and yˆ ≥ y with strict inequality in at least one case, then both A and B would
insist on the middle piece. They would each consider its value to be strictly greater than t,
and other pieces’ values to be t or less.
If xˆ ≥ x and yˆ ≤ y with strict inequality in at least one case, then no player would accept
the middle piece. Each player would consider some other piece to have value at least t, and
the middle piece to have value strictly less than t.
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By symmetry we are left only to consider the possibility that xˆ ≥ x and yˆ ≥ y with strict
inequality in at least one case. It is clear that both A and C prefer the leftmost piece to the
rightmost piece, so if the division is to be envy free the rightmost piece must be accepted by
B. We will show that in that case, A and C both insist on the leftmost piece.
Let S1 = [x, xˆ] and S2 = [y, yˆ]—that is, S1 and S2 are the slivers that distinguish cuts at
xˆ, yˆ from cuts at x, y. If B accepts the rightmost piece, it is because
vB(yˆ, 1) ≥ vB(xˆ, yˆ)
vB(y, 1)− vB(S2) ≥ vB(x, y) + vB(S2)− vB(S1)
t− vB(S2) ≥ t+ vB(S2)− vB(S1)
vB(S1) ≥ 2vB(S2).
So B considers S1 to be twice as valuable as S2, and by the previous lemma the other players
must consider S2 to be less than twice as valuable as S1. By a calculation like the one just
made, it follows that
vA(0, xˆ) > vA(xˆ, yˆ)
so player A insists on the leftmost piece. The same is true of player C by a wider margin.
Therefore no player will accept the middle piece, and no division with cuts at xˆ and yˆ can
be envy free. 2
The next lemma tells us that one player in a rigid measure system can’t determine the
parameters of the system from its own measure. Further, this remains true even if the player
knows the other players’ measures outside of neighborhoods of the likely cuts.
Lemma 3 Let vA, vB, and vC form a rigid measure system with parameters x, y, s, t, let
η > 0, and let i be one of the players. Let xˆ be sufficiently close to x. Then there exist
parameters yˆ, sˆ, tˆ, and a rigid measure system vˆA, vˆB, vˆC with parameters xˆ, yˆ, sˆ, tˆ, such
that
• vˆi = vi; that is, player i’s new measure agrees with its old measure;
• vˆj(u, v) = v(u, v) for all j, u, v if neither u nor v is within η of x or y. That is, all of
the new measures agree with the old measures outside of the specified neighborhoods of
x and y.
These conditions mean that player i can’t tell whether it is participating in the system
vA,vB,vC or the system vˆA,vˆB,vˆC.
Proof: The requirement that xˆ be sufficiently close to x means that there is an  > 0
such that whenever |xˆ− x| < , the lemma applies.
For clarity we will consider only the case of i = A. We therefore fix vˆA = vA.
Choose tˆ near t—how near, we will determine as we go along. Set sˆ = 1− 2tˆ and choose
xˆ and yˆ such that vA(0, xˆ) = tˆ and vA(0, yˆ) = 2tˆ. Note that xˆ and yˆ are both continuous
functions of tˆ.
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We need for xˆ and yˆ to satisfy |xˆ−x| < η and |yˆ− y| < η. Since vA(0, u) is a continuous
function of u, these both follow if tˆ is sufficiently close to vA(0, x) = t and 2tˆ is sufficiently
close to vA(0, y) = 2t. These are the first two of many constraints on the choice of tˆ.
Assume that we have chosen tˆ so that |xˆ−x| < η and |yˆ−y| < η. We must now construct
the vˆB and vˆC. Now we can construct these measures by assigning values to vˆB(0, u) and
vˆC(0, u) for each u; these assignments will determine the measures entirely. We assign:
• vˆB(0, u) = vB(0, u) and vˆC(0, u) = vC(0, u) if u is not within η of x or y.
• vˆB(0, xˆ) = sˆ and vˆB(0, yˆ)=sˆ+ tˆ.
• vˆC(0, xˆ) = tˆ and vˆC(0, yˆ)=sˆ+ tˆ.
• Finally, we extend vˆB(0, u) and vˆC(0, u) to values of u in the intervals [x−η, xˆ], [xˆ, x+η],
[y − η, yˆ], and [yˆ, y + η].
It is clear that vˆA, vˆB, vˆC form a rigid measure system provided that they meet the
density requirements; that is, provided that the densities of vˆB and vˆC stay strictly between√
2/2 and
√
2. If they do, then the system clearly has the required parameters xˆ, yˆ, sˆ, tˆ and
meets the requirements of the lemma.
The measures meet the density requirement if the slopes of vˆB(0, u) and vˆC(0, u) are
between
√
2/2 and
√
2 on all four of the intervals to which these functions were extended
linearly. This amounts to sixteen inequalities. We consider only one of them, the requirement
that the slope of vˆB(0, u) be less than
√
2 on the interval [x− η, xˆ]. This is equivalent to
vˆB(x− η, xˆ) <
√
2 (xˆ− (x− η)) .
Both sides of this inequality are continuous functions of xˆ, and hence of tˆ. The inequality is
true when tˆ = t, because in that case xˆ = x and vˆB has the same slope as vB in the interval.
Therefore, this inequality holds if tˆ is in a sufficiently small open neighborhood of t. The
other fifteen inequalities impose similar constraints. So we need only to choose tˆ sufficiently
close to t to make all of them hold, and then vˆA, vˆB, and vˆC meet the requirements of the
lemma. 2
4 There is no finite protocol
Theorem 1 There is no finite protocol that reliably finds an envy-free division of a cake.
Proof: We show that the theorem holds if the players’ measures form a rigid measure
system, even if the protocol is allowed to rely that fact.
Suppose, on the contrary, that we have such a finite protocol. To reach a contradiction
we will construct a rigid measure system with parameters x, y, s, and t, such that the
protocol does not make a mark at x or y after any number of steps. Since the only envy-free
allocations require cuts at x and y, this means that the protocol cannot terminate. This
contradicts the assumption that the protocol is finite. The theorem will follow.
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We start with any rigid measure system {vi} with parameters x, y, s, and t, and make a
sequence of alterations to it as follows.
Suppose that the protocol has proceeded for N steps, and that no mark has been made
at x or y. Let η > 0 be less than the smallest distance from x or y to any mark. Allow the
protocol to continue through step N + 1; suppose that the protocol selects player i and real
number α and asks player i for its α-point. If the resulting mark is not at x or y, continue.
Suppose, instead, that the resulting mark is at x or y. Then we need to alter the measures.
From the final lemma above, we can find a number xˆ 6= x, and a rigid measure system {vˆi}
with parameters xˆ, yˆ, sˆ, tˆ such that
• vi = vˆi, and
• vj(u, v) = vˆj(u, v) for all j and all existing marks u, v.
The last item is true because all existing marks are at distance η from x and y.
Now we replace the system {vi} with the new system {vˆi}. The above points mean
that all of the information available to player i, and to the protocol, is identical for both
systems, so player i still answers the (N +1)-st query with x or y—that is, not with the new
parameters xˆ or yˆ. Answers to previous queries are unchanged as well. So, for our new rigid
measure system, the protocol has failed to find the right cuts through step N + 1.
Continue in this way. It might be necessary to make infinitely many changes in the
measures. But, if we take the precaution of choosing the values of η at each step so that
they converge to zero, only finitely many changes to the measures are made that affect any
point. That is, the successive rigid measure systems converge to one rigid measure system,
and for that set of measures, the protocol never makes a mark at the points where the cuts
would have to be made. 2
5 Cases with n > 3
Cases with n > 3 can be handled in exactly the same way. When n = 5, for example, a rigid
measure system has parameters x1, x2, x3, x4, s, and t satisfying 0 < x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < 1
and 0 < s < 1/5 < t < 1/2. The measures are governed by the table
[0, x1] [x1, x2] [x2, x3] [x3, x4] [x4, 1]
v1 t t s s s
v2 s t t s s
v3 s s t t s
v4 s s s t t
v5 t s s s t
As in the case of n = 3, we arrange that there are exactly two envy-free allocations, and
both of them require cuts at x1, x2, x3, x4. All steps of the proof are exactly the same as for
n = 3.
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